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ABSTRACT 
For the modern Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is all about bad cops. 
Per the Court, the rule works exclusively by deterring those officers, who by dint of malice, 
recklessness, or negligence are otherwise prone to Fourth Amendment intrusions. That sounds 
reasonable. However, the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect on bad cops is nothing more than 
hopeful conjecture; empirical support is lacking and economic models disappoint. This is not to 
say the exclusionary rule doesn't "work". The exclusionary rule works just fine in promoting 
constitutional policing in America; it just doesn’t work the way the modern Court insists it must. 
What matters is not the exclusionary rule’s impact on a small subset of bad cops. What matters 
is the rule’s impact on all the good cops out there; i.e., that broad majority of police who go to 
work every day intending to respect Fourth Amendment boundaries. To stay on the right side of 
those boundaries, good cops need two tools: Fourth Amendment rules of engagement and 
training in how to apply those rules in the field. The exclusionary rule, working in perhaps 
unexpected ways, provides both. 
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The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has always been a bit 
preposterous.  It’s worth recalling that in its classic form, the rule requires 
exclusion of ill-gotten evidence as the remedy for any Fourth Amendment 
violation—no matter how serious the constitutional intrusion, how culpable the 
offending officer, or how essential the evidence to proving guilt.  Sure, modern 
Supreme Court precedent limits the rule’s application, especially with regard 
to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.
1
  But, at least on paper, there are 
still plenty of circumstances where the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
contemplates a plainly guilty murderer escaping justice because of an officer’s 
otherwise de minimis Fourth Amendment violation.  No matter where you 
ultimately land on the exclusionary rule, that is a jolting notion. 
 So why the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule?
2
  To answer that 
question, you need to first understand that the rule is not constitutionally 
mandated.  Scholars still argue about the rule’s constitutional grounding,
3
 but 
as a matter of Supreme Court precedent, for the last fifty years the Fourth 
 
 1 See generally infra Part III (reviewing impact of the Supreme Court’s expansive good faith exception 
to application of the exclusionary rule). 
 2 This Article focuses exclusively on the utility of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, i.e., the 
rule that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights should be 
excluded from the government’s proof at a criminal trial.  Exclusion is also an available remedy for 
oral statements obtained through violations of a defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.  
However, violations of these provisions can actually render the statements obtained unreliable: e.g., 
a confession is more likely to be false if it is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.  See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: 
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997).  This 
presents a unique utilitarian justification for exclusion of unlawfully obtained oral statements.  See 
Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 859 (1995) (noting that reliability is the “best reason” underlying the 
rule of exclusion for violations of Fifth Amendment rights).  In contrast, exclusion under the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be premised on reliability; tangible evidence is no more or less reliable 
depending on the constitutionality of the police evidence-gathering.  Because of this distinction, the 
exclusionary rule’s operation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 3 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 357 (2013) (reviewing debate and arguing that the rule is constitutionally 
required to give meaning to Fourth Amendment rights); see also Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) 
the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 623 (1983) (arguing the exclusionary rule should be viewed as 
constitutionally required). 
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Amendment exclusionary rule has been nothing more than a public policy 
choice.
4
  The rule’s legitimacy stems not from a reading of the Constitution 




The costs of the exclusionary rule are real, if often overblown.  Yes, on 
paper the rule contemplates allowing a guilty murderer to escape justice 
because of an officer’s bumbling Fourth Amendment intrusion.  But that 
actually never happens.  In real life, courts are able to work around the rule 
where exclusion of evidence would undermine prosecution of a serious crime.
6
  
(Indeed, if you can find a recent report of an obviously guilty violent felon 
walking free because of the exclusionary rule, let me know.)  This is not to say 
the rule is meaningless.  There are tens of thousands motions to exclude filed 
in American criminal courts every year.
7
  And while only a small percentage 
are actually granted,
8
 invariably where minor crimes are involved,
9
 year in and 





 4 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“In sum, the rule is a judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather 
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” (footnote omitted)); Davis v. United States, 
564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (“Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to 
‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.” (citation omitted); Mark E. Cammack, 
The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. 
L. 631, 631 (2010) (reviewing that exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the 
constitution is no longer understood as a constitutional mandate). 
 5 See infra Part IV (reviewing modern Court’s adoption of a cost-benefit analysis for application of the 
exclusion remedy). 
 6 See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003) 
(reviewing that judges “d[o] not like the idea of dangerous criminals being released into society” and 
therefore when facing a clearly guilty murderer or rapist making a Fourth Amendment claim, a judge 
will find “that the search, the seizure, or the invasion of privacy was reasonable”). 
 7 In 2016, for instance, in Texas alone, criminal courts resolved over 4,000 motions to suppress.  See 
OFF. CT. ADMIN., TEX. JUD. BRANCH, Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary (2016), 
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436989/annual-statistical-report-for-the-texas-judiciary-fy-2016.pdf 
(analyzing statistics related to Texas judiciary’s operations in 2016). 
 8 See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1994) (reviewing startlingly low rate of successful motions to suppress). 
 9 See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 
234–35 (1987) (reviewing study confirming that “vast majority” of granted motions to exclude involve 
crimes where the defendant, if convicted, “would never have been given detention time”). 
 10 See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (excluding evidence obtained when officer 
entered curtilage of home without a warrant during investigation of stolen motorcycle). 
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Balanced against these costs are the public policy benefits obtained by the 
exclusionary rule’s operation.  For the modern Supreme Court, the benefit of 
the rule is its deterrence effect: we accept the costs of the exclusionary rule 
because the rule deters those police officers who—by dint of malice, 
recklessness, or negligence—might otherwise intrude on a suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.
11
  The threat that any ill-gotten evidence will be excluded 
from a suspect’s trial, the reasoning goes, overcomes (deters) the bad cop’s 
propensity to violate their fellow citizen’s rights. 
That sounds reasonable, especially if you believe there is a critical mass of 
bad cops out there who need deterring.  But there is a problem with this “it 
deters bad cops” theory of the exclusionary rule’s utility.  It is little more than 
hopeful conjecture.  After nearly a century of study,
12
 there is still no reliable 
evidence that the threat of exclusion of evidence deters bad cops in the field 
from committing Fourth Amendment violations.
13 
It is not for lack of trying.  Plenty of scholars have attempted to measure 
the exclusionary rule’s impact on officer decision-making.  But when you 
survey the literature, the best you can conclude is that maybe the threat of 
 
 11 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011) (“[W]e have said time and again that the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.” (citations omitted)); see 
also infra Part III.   
 12 The notion that the threat of exclusion might deter bad cops in the field from Fourth Amendment 
transgressions dates at least to 1925.  See Thomas E. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained 
through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 11, 24 (1925) (arguing that “[i]f 
the officers know that the evidence which they obtain through violation of the Amendment cannot 
be used, they will have no incentive to indulge in even merely technical violations”); see generally 
Comment, Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
373 (1974) (providing a good review of the early development of the bad cop deterrence theory).  
 13 See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 
595 (2011) (reviewing the literature and concluding “[w]hether measured in terms of arrests, 
convictions, or exclusions at trial, the empirical literature has failed to establish either the benefits or 
the costs of the exclusionary rule”); Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery, 39 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 755, 765 (2008) (observing “a disturbing absence of any genuine empirical evidence pertaining 
to the Court’s assumptions that underlie the modern exclusionary rule”). 
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losing evidence sometimes deters bad cops here and there.
14
  But probably 
not.
15
  And we will probably never know anyway. 
The problem is that empiricism is nigh-impossible when it comes to 
measuring a rule’s deterrent effects.  Police officers, like folks generally, obey 
legal rules for all sorts of reasons—fear of a sanction, for sure, but also because 
of their good intentions, their professionalism, their training, and lots and lots 
of other things that inform a person’s decision-making.
16
  Isolating the degree 
 
 14 The studies often cited in support of the exclusionary rule’s deterrent impacts are generally based on 
interviews or questionnaires submitted to fairly small and geographically isolated samples of officers.  
See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule 
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO L. REV. 75, 81–82, 84–85 (1992) [hereinafter Orfield, 
Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor] (interviewing fourteen public defenders, twelve judges, 
eleven states attorneys and three other prosecutors and noting that in response to question, “Does 
the exclusionary rule deter unlawful police behavior[,]” every respondent save one answered in the 
affirmative); see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical 
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1987) [hereinafter Orfield, 
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers] (interviewing twenty-six Chicago narcotics officers and 
concluding that the exclusionary rule has “significant deterrent effects”); Michael Katz, The Supreme 
Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina. The Model, the Study, and 
the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119, 131–32 (1966) (reviewing ninety questionnaires completed 
by ninety North Carolina officers and concluding that exclusion has deterrent impacts); Stuart S. 
Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, 284 
(reviewing questionnaires completed by 113 respondents and concluding that exclusion reduces 
illegal searches).  See generally L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald 
W. Fagan, If it’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A New and Extensive 
Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially 
Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 678–709 (1998) (providing an exhaustive critical review of 
these and other studies). 
 15 The more statistically reliable studies are generally skeptical that the exclusionary rule obtains 
appreciable deterrence of officers in the field.  See Perrin et al., supra note 14, at 673 (reviewing 
questionnaire response by 450 officers in five police departments and concluding that rule has no 
deterrent impacts on officers in the field); see also Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 755 (1970) (conducting meta-analysis of data from 
previous studies and concluding that “[a]s a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures 
by the police, the exclusionary rule is a failure”); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical 
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 245 (1973) (studying 
records of arrests, convictions, and motions filed in Chicago over two decades and concluding that 
rule has no deterrent impacts). 
 16 See Perrin, et al., supra note 14, at 711 (“The motivations of law enforcement officials defy direct 
observation, and that constitutes one of the most imposing barriers to the study of the rule.”); Randy 
E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles 
of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 944 (1983) (observing that measuring the deterrence impact of the 
exclusionary rule “require[s] speculation about the motives of countless individuals, each acting upon 
his or her own schedule of preferences and desires, and about how these preferences may be 
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to which an officer in the field towed the constitutional line because of the 
exclusionary rule becomes a fool’s errand.
17  
Of course, the lack of empirical evidence does not mean that the 
exclusionary rule does not have a deterrent impact on bad cops.18  But when 
empirical data is unattainable, support for a legal rule can usually be found in 
behavioral economics.  And when it comes to predicting the exclusionary 
rule’s purported deterrent effects, the economic models disappoint.
19
 
At first blush, the notion that the threat of exclusion will deter a bad cop 
in the field is appealingly rational—if a painful consequence is likely to flow 
from an action, one will forebear from doing it.
20
  But the economic model 
dictates that for deterrence to work, there needs to be some appreciable 
 
influenced in the desired direction by one rule or another”); Oaks, supra note 15, at 715 (“Any 
attempt to determine whether or the extent to which the exclusionary rule affects the behavior of law 
enforcement personnel confronts an exceedingly complicated inquiry into human motivation within 
a complex social model . . . .”). 
 17 See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363, 368–69 (observing that “[n]o one is going to win the empirical debate over whether the 
exclusionary rule deters the police from committing a significant number of illegal searches and 
seizures”).  This lack of empirical support for the bad cop deterrence theory has vexed generations 
of scholars.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 
49, 54 (observing that “[n]o one actually knows how effective the exclusionary rule is as a deterrent”); 
see also Oaks, supra note 15, at 709 (doubting that it is possible to quantity the effects of the 
exclusionary rule on policing); John Barker Waite, Evidence—Police Regulation by Rules of 
Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REV. 679, 685 (1944) (noting that deterrence is “a logical enough theory” but 
not “one shred of evidence has been discovered” to support it). 
 18 But see Oaks, supra note 15, 675–78 (calling the rhetoric used to patch over the weak empirical basis 
for the exclusionary rule as “no more than fig-leaf phrases used to cover naked ignorance”); William 
T. Plumb, Jr., Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 380–81 (1939) (expressing 
doubt that the exclusionary rule discourages illegal searches and observing that “wise judgments” 
about the rule “cannot be based on mere speculation and unproved assumptions”). 
 19 See generally Jacobi, supra note 13, at 585–95 (conducting economic analysis of exclusionary rule 
and finding bare support for asserted deterrence impacts on officers in field); Slobogin, supra note 
17, at 372–75 (concluding that both economic and behavioral theories suggest the exclusionary rule 
“is not a particularly effective way of motivating police to obey the Fourth Amendment”). 
 20 See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 782 (2010) (reviewing that “[d]eterrence theory is a theory of crime 
that presumes that human beings are rational enough to consider the consequences of their actions 
and to be influenced by those consequences”); Aaron Chaflin & Justin McCrary, Criminal 
Deterrence:  A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 5, 7–12 (2017) (reviewing Gary 
Becker’s neo-classical model of criminal behavior that “envisions crime a gamble undertaken by a 
rational individual”). 
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  And while hard numbers are elusive, the chance 
that a bad cop’s constitutional violation will lead to exclusion of evidence in a 
trial are, without question, vanishingly small. 
There are just so many sharp turns between an officer’s Fourth 
Amendment transgression and a successful motion to exclude.
22
  To begin, for 
a motion to be filed, there needs to be an actual arrest.  But estimates suggest 
an astonishing number of Fourth Amendment intrusions do not actually end 
in an arrest.  By way of example, one study found that of thirty-four obvious 
Fourth Amendment violations committed by officers in the field, only three 
resulted in an arrest.
23
  This is the rule’s classic underrepresentation problem: 
a bad cop who has no intention of pursuing an arrest would not be deterred 




 21 See Paternoster, supra note 20, at 784 (reviewing modern studies confirming that certainty of 
punishment is key to deterrence); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 
CRIME & JUST. 199, 201 (2013) (reviewing studies and concluding that certainty of punishment is key 
to deterrence); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 821, 833 (2013) (reviewing that under economic model, the exclusionary rule only 
“discourages an unconstitutional search if the loss of the evidence discovered, multiplied by the 
likelihood of exclusion, exceeds the value of the evidence the police anticipate finding” (emphasis 
added)). 
 22 See generally Barnett, supra note 16, at 955–56 (reviewing series of unlikely events that must occur 
before an officer’s Fourth Amendment transgression will result in actual exclusion of relevant 
evidence); Slobogin, supra note 17, at 375–80 (same). 
 23 See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the 
U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 332 (2004) (reviewing results of observational 
study indicating that thirty-one out of thirty-four unconstitutional searches of citizens “would never 
reach the courts’ eyes because suspects were neither cited nor taken into custody”); Slobogin, supra 
note 17, at 374–75 (“In a large number of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the police 
do not make an arrest, either because they never intended to do so or because they find nothing, so 
the exclusionary rule never has a chance to come into play.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Adam Gabbatt, 
Stop and Frisk:  Only 3% of 2.4m Stops Result in Conviction, Report Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 
2013, 13:18 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/stop-and-frisk-new-york-
conviction-rate (reviewing report establishing that of 2.3 million stop and frisk searches conducted in 
New York City from 2009–2012, only 150,000, or 3%, resulted in arrest). 
 24 Scholars observe that officers might conduct unconstitutional searches with no intent to arrest in 
order to obtain other objectives like removing weapons and narcotics from the community.  See 
Jacobi, supra note 13, at 675 (observing that police “incentives are other than the exclusionary rule 
presumes: police variously value arrests, harassing minorities, being perceived as effective at 
controlling crime, and safeguarding the community—not just guaranteeing convictions”); Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
785, 793 (1970) (reviewing that individual officers are generally rewarded for their number of arrests, 
not their number of arrests that lead to successful prosecutions).  See generally Donald Dripps, The 
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In the unlikely event that there is an arrest, for the exclusion “punishment” 
to remain in play, the defendant would then need to actually file a motion and, 
after that, a court would then need to actually rule upon it.
25
  But over ninety-
seven percent of federal cases and ninety-four percent of state cases are 
resolved by plea bargain,
26
 most well before a motion to exclude is 
contemplated much less ruled upon.
27
  And if a motion is filed and survives 
plea bargaining, standing in the way of success of even the most well-founded 
motion are huge obstacles including overburdened defense counsel,
28
 a deep 
judicial bias in favor of police testimony,
29





Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court:  Normative and Empirical 
Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 223 (2010) (noting that 
police may find “considerable utility” in unlawful searches that do not lead to arrest).   
 25 See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 
AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 585, 585 (reviewing database of 7500 cases in nine-county study across 
three states and establishing that “[m]otions to suppress physical evidence are filed in fewer than 5% 
of the cases”).  Importantly, even when there is an unlawful search leading to an arrest, the court’s 
standing rules might still preclude an actionable motion to exclude.  See Perrin et al., supra note 14, 
at 675 (“The narrowing of the class of persons who have standing lessens the likelihood that the rule 
will be imposed, which further restricts its potential to deter.”). 
 26 See Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 326, 327 (2011) (discussing the steadily increasing rate of cases 
resolved by plea bargain). 
 27 See Perrin et al., supra note 14, at 750 (“Police know that most cases will end in a plea of guilty or 
some disposition other than a contested trial, and thus, are not deterred in many (if not most) 
instances.”).  But see Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1065, 1086 (1982) (recognizing that the exclusionary rule may play a far greater role in plea-
bargaining than in trials: “Although the guilty rarely go free because of the rule, they may receive 
reduced charges or sentences”). 
 28 See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-
loads.html?smid=pl-share (reviewing excessive caseloads handled by public defense attorneys across 
the nation). 
 29 Many scholars have observed that this judicial bias is, regrettably, exacerbated by police perjury.  See 
Jacobi, supra note 13, at 607–09 (reviewing scholarship suggesting that real impact of exclusionary 
rule is that it encourages police perjury in order to ensure Court does not find a Fourth Amendment 
violation); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police 
Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 272–77 (2017) (providing a staggering catalog 
of police misconduct on the stand). 
 30 See Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 
103 GEO. L.J. 1543, 1580 (2015) (discussing study indicating that judges, through a process of 
“motivated cognition[,]” will unconsciously construe facts to avoid finding a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
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In the end, of that tiny fraction of cases where there is an arrest, a motion 
is filed, and a court rules upon it, only about three percent of the motions are 
granted.
31
  Again, hard numbers are elusive, but even giving the most generous 
odds at each turn, they multiply to the point that the exclusionary rule’s 
deterrent effect on bad cops becomes absurdly speculative.  In the end, it is 
simply hard to take seriously the notion that a bad cop might forebear from a 
Fourth Amendment intrusion out of some concern that evidence might be 




Does this mean the exclusionary rule doesn’t work?  No.  The 
exclusionary rule surely does promote constitutional policing in America; it 
just doesn’t work the way the Supreme Court says it does.  What matters is 
not the rule’s deterrence effect on a small set of bad cops prone to Fourth 
Amendment intrusions.  What matters is the rule’s impact on all the good 
cops—that broad majority of police officers who go to work every day with a 
sincere interest in respecting Fourth Amendment boundaries.
33
  
Consider that in the course of her police work, a good cop will naturally 
run into all sorts of Fourth Amendment questions: Do I need a warrant to 
attach a GPS device to a suspect’s car?  How do I go about establishing 
probable cause for a DUI arrest?  The scenarios are endless really, and in 
each one, the good cop has to identify a line—on the one side, solid police 
 
 31 See Maclin, supra note 8, at 44 (recounting study indicating startlingly low rate of successful motions 
to suppress).  It also bears mentioning that courts are notorious for only granting motions to exclude 
in those cases where a conviction is likely even without the tainted evidence.  See Donald Dripps, 
Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 924 (1986) (observing that successful suppression motions do 
not guarantee acquittals and reviewing a study where “at least two thirds of the prosecutions involving 
successful suppression motions nevertheless yielded convictions”). 
 32 See Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, 75 
MO. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (conducting economic analysis and concluding that exclusionary rule 
“does not and cannot deter police misconduct” because “the expected cost to the police of their own 
misconduct . . . is nearly always zero” and  “the probability that the evidence will be suppressed . . . 
even in cases of egregious police misconduct, is very close to zero”). 
 33 That one can measure the utility of the exclusionary rule by looking at either “bad cops” or “good 
cops” has been previously suggested in the literature.  See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
about First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 852 (1994) (recognizing that “exclusionary rule 
litigation may be important not so much for the fear that it inspires in the ‘bad cop,’ but rather in the 
way that it creates an alternative vision of the ‘good cop’”); Albert Alschuler, “Close Enough For 
Government Work”: The Exclusionary Rule after Leon, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 354 (suggesting 
that exclusionary rule serves “those ‘good guy’ officers who seek to comply with constitutional norms 
and who do not fit the Supreme Court’s ‘gangbusters’ stereotype”). 
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work, and on the other, an unreasonable intrusion unto the civil liberties of a 
free people.  It is a lot to ask really, especially in the heat of a criminal 
investigation.  But, of course, all day every day in America, good cops manage 
the constitutional lines quite well.  How is this so?  It’s the exclusionary rule, 
working in perhaps unexpected ways. 
To do her job consonant with Fourth Amendment values, the first thing a 
good cop needs are rules of engagement: when do I have constitutional 
authority for a search or seizure and when do I not?  The good cop needs a 
map, if you will, of where the constitutional boundaries lie.  Where is the 
exclusionary rule’s work here?  In Part I, this Article examines the well-
established mechanism by which motion practice under the rule fosters 
appellate court precedents that effectively establish the rules of engagement 
for good cops to follow.  Indeed, just about everything that a good cop knows 
about constitutional policing is the product of exclusionary rule practice. 
Of course, to be successful, good cops need more than rules of 
engagement.  They also need training on how to apply those rules in the field. 
Where is the exclusionary rule’s work here?  In Part II, this Article examines 
the causal link between exclusionary rule practice and quality police training 
in Fourth Amendment values.  The cause and effect is best explained by the 
doctrine of systemic deterrence—the notion that, while an individual cop might 
not be impacted by loss of evidence in a particular case, the aggregate of lost 
evidence would express at a systems level.  Thus, police departments will train 
good cops how to stay on the right side of Fourth Amendment boundaries. 
Scholars and jurists do not dispute the premises of this “it gives good cops 
the tools they need” theory of the exclusionary rule’s utility.  Indeed, even 
conservative members of the Supreme Court acknowledge that exclusionary 
rule practice fosters necessary constitutional boundary drawing and promotes 
quality police training.
34
  Yet, when balancing the benefits of the exclusionary 
rule against its costs, the Supreme Court will only recognize a singular benefit—
the dubious notion that it deters bad cops in the field from Fourth 
Amendment intrusions.
35
  Somehow, apparently as a matter of law, any other 
public policy benefits of the exclusionary rule must be ignored. 
 
34  See supra note 30 and accompanying text; infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
35  See infra notes 94-96. 
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In Part III, this Article tries to make some sense of this, explaining that the 
primacy of the bad cop deterrence theory was once necessary to anchor 
conservative efforts to defang the exclusionary rule with a broad “good faith” 
exception.  However, with the Court signaling a future exclusionary rule 
regime that relies on a pure cost/benefits analysis in all contexts, the rule that 
the exclusionary rule must only be about deterring bad cops becomes a 
doctrinal relic.
36
  Thus, this Article concludes in Part IV, the time may be ripe 
for a fair assessment of how the exclusionary rule fosters better policing in 
America. 
I. 
Since Marbury v. Madison in 1803, it has been understood that it is the 
Supreme Court that defines and gives value to the provisions of the 
Constitution.
37
  For our purposes, this means that the judicial branch exercises 
a singular power to give meaning to the Fourth Amendment—which is all fine 
and dandy so long as the there are some cases on the docket that ask the Court 
to interpret the Fourth Amendment.  But prior to 1961, when the Court 
imposed the exclusionary rule on state court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio,38 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment docket was rather bare.  This matters.  Good 
cops in 1955 knew that they needed a warrant to enter a home,
39
 and that they 
didn’t need one to search a car,
40
 but beyond that they were largely left to 
navigate Fourth Amendment boundaries on their own.
41
  The Court simply 




36  See infra Part IV. 
 37 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 38 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 39 See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314 (1921) (declaring a non-consensual search of a 
home without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34–
35 (1925) (same). 
 40 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (admitting evidence seized from a car, 
where the police had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband). 
 41 A search of the Westlaw database for U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing the “exclusionary rule” 
indicates that prior to Mapp, the rule prompted the court to draw Fourth Amendment boundaries 
roughly thirty times.  In contrast, since Mapp, the rule has prompted the court to draw boundaries 
over 250 times. 
 42 The problem was rooted in the limited reach of exclusionary rule as it was first announced in Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  The Weeks rule was a Fourth Amendment decision that only 
governed federal courts, and federal criminal jurisdiction extended to only a small fraction of crimes 
in America.  Thus, while there was a small rush of Fourth Amendment cases that reached the 
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Consequently, good cops in the field knew very little about what was—and was 
not—an unreasonable search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.
43
 
Everything changed after Mapp.  Because state courts prosecute the vast 
majority of crimes in America,
44
 Mapp ignited an explosion of exclusionary 
rule practice. In turn, the courts suddenly faced broad new classes of cases 
squarely presenting Fourth Amendment questions for resolution—cases that 
allowed the courts to create in short time a deep body of law to guide good 
cops in the field. 
Here is a way to look at it: There is a “Legal Training Handbook” updated 
each year by the Chief Counsel’s Office of the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center.
45
  The Handbook serves both as a foundational text for 
training new federal law enforcement officers and as a reference guide for 
 
Supreme Court during Prohibition, when Prohibition was repealed in 1933, “[t]he flow of search 
cases to the federal Supreme Court was reduced to a trickle[.]”  Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme 
Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search 
and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 971 (2010).  It is true that a number 
of state courts had adopted some version of the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp.  See Wesley M. 
Oliver, Prohibition’s Anachronistic Exclusionary Rule, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 511 (2018) 
(reviewing that twenty-two states had adopted a full-fledged exclusionary rule by the time of Mapp).  
But the state exclusionary rule cases only prompted state courts to draw state constitutional 
boundaries; these cases were silent as to the Fourth Amendment.  See DAVIES, supra, at 970 
(discussing state exclusionary rule cases). 
 43 Writing in 1962, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recalled that the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to impose the exclusionary rule on state courts during the 1950s “frustrated the possibilities 
of litigation in the Supreme Court that could have given more than spectral illumination of the right.  
In consequence no case law developed at the highest level to yield guiding standards for determining 
what searches and seizures would be subject to condemnation under the fourteenth amendment.”  
Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 327.  The legislative 
branch could have conceivably filled the rule-making void, but before Mapp, “the several legislatures 
have given less than adequate attention to the need for clear-cut rules on police conduct.”  Wayne R. 
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule—Part II:  Defining the 
Norms and Training the Police, 30 MO. L. REV. 566, 569 (1965); see also Donald A. Dripps, 
Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure:  Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for 
Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 45 (2001) (“American legislatures consistently have 
failed to address defects in the criminal process, even when they rise to crisis-level proportions.”). 
44  See Robert P. Mosteller, The Sixth Amendment Rights to Fairness: The Touchstones of 
Effectiveness and Pragmatism, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (reviewing that the “vast majority” 
of serious criminal prosecutions are handled in state courts and that “criminal justice remains the 
predominant responsibility of states and localities, rather than the federal criminal system”); see also 
Comparing Federal & State Courts, U.S. COURTS (last visited March 18, 2021), available at 
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-
courts (noting that state courts hear most criminal cases). 
 45 OFF. CHIEF COUNS., FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
LEGAL TRAINING HANDBOOK (2019) [hereinafter LEGAL TRAINING HANDBOOK]. 
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officers in the field.  The Handbook is over 500 pages long.  There is, inter 
alia, a chapter dedicated to investigating internet crimes, one dedicated to how 
to conduct an interrogation, and one dedicated to offering professional 
courtroom testimony.  But the Legal Training Handbook's longest chapter by 
far—120 pages in all—addresses the Fourth Amendment.
46
 
Among many, many other rules, the Fourth Amendment chapter offers 
the rules for which searches require warrants and which do not, the rules for 
making a lawful arrest and conducting searches incident thereto, the rules for 
building probable cause in the field, the rules underlying the plain view 
doctrine, the rules for submitting a valid search warrant application, and the 
rules for searching impounded property.
47
  What matters for our purposes is 
that each of these rules—each of those boundaries drawn to guide good cops 
in the field—is a product of exclusionary rule practice. 
Say, for instance, a good cop is investigating a suspected drug 
manufacturing operation in a private home.  She knows that there may be 
material evidence in the home’s garbage, which raises the question—do you 
need a warrant to search someone’s trash?  Those rules are on page 353 of 
the Legal Training Handbook.
 48
  Here is what a good cop needs to know in 
order to conduct a constitutionally-sound search: While you clearly need a 
warrant to search a suspect’s garbage in a home or the home’s curtilage, you 
do not need a warrant to search trash left for pick-up.  Where did that latter 
rule come from?  It was announced by the Supreme Court in 1988 in 
California v. Greenwood.49  And what prompted the Court to announce that 
new rule for good cops to follow?  Billy Greenwood, after he was charged with 
a narcotics offense, filed a motion in the Orange County, California Superior 
Court to exclude evidence police discovered after officers searched his garbage 
without first seeking a warrant.
50
  Since Mapp, that process modeled in 
Greenwood—a motion to exclude filed in a trial court leading to a new Fourth 
Amendment boundary articulated by an appellate court—has occurred over 
 
 46 See id. at 337–457 (addressing Fourth Amendment limitations, as applied to federal agents). 
 47 See generally id. at 337–341 (guiding federal agents on proper Fourth Amendment practices). 
 48 Id. at 353. 
 49 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (explaining that “having deposited their 
garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public 
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,’ respondents could have had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.”) (citation omitted). 
 50 Id. at 38. 
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and over again.  Until today good cops have at their disposal a Fourth 
Amendment playbook that measures at 120 pages.
51 
This direct line between exclusionary rule practice and judicial articulation 
of Fourth Amendment rules has long been recognized by scholars and jurists.  
In his otherwise critical study of the rule, Dallin Oaks acknowledged that the 
exclusionary rule provides a “practical procedure by which courts can review 
alleged violations of constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of those 
rights.”
52
  And writing for the Court in Davis v. United States, a 2011 decision, 
Justice Alito recognized that the Court’s exclusionary rule decisions were 
intended to guide good cops in the field.
53
  Justice Alito explained that “well-
trained officers will and should use” the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
precedents “to fulfill their crime-detection and public safety responsibilities.”
54
  
He went on to explain that “[r]esponsible law enforcement officers will take 
care to learn ‘what is required of them’ under Fourth Amendment precedent 
and will conform their conduct to these rules.”
55
  
This boundary-drawing function of the exclusionary rule does not sunset.  
As technology evolves and new investigatory tactics become available, good 
cops will always have new questions about what is, and what is not, a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion.  In 1967, the question was whether the Fourth 
Amendment required police to get a warrant before tapping a phone.
56
  In 
2001, the question was about capturing a thermal image of a home.
57
  And last 
year, the question was about tracking cell phone location data.
58
  All of these 
questions, naturally, were brought to the Supreme Court by way of a motion 
 
 51 See generally LEGAL TRAINING HANDBOOK, supra note 45. 
 52 Oaks, supra note 15, at 756; see id. (“The advantage of the exclusionary rule—entirely apart from any 
direct deterrent effect—is that it provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the 
constitutional guarantees.”); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 1072 (“The first implicit function of the 
rule is to express the judiciary’s constitutional regulatory power to review and establish standards of 
lawful police behavior.”);  LaFave, supra note 43, at 580 (“One of the principal virtues of the 
exclusionary rule is that it assures a great deal of judicial attention to questions concerning police 
practices.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
53  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011). 
54  Id. 
 55 Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006)) 
 56 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349–50 (1967) (considering whether police require a warrant 
to tap a phone in a phone booth). 
 57 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (considering whether police require a warrant to 
aim a thermal-imaging device at a home). 
 58 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (considering whether obtaining cell 
phone tracking information is a Fourth Amendment search). 
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to exclude; by resolving these cases, the Court gave officers the guidance they 
needed to respect constitutional boundaries. (The Fourth Amendment 
requires a warrant in all the above).
 59
 
This presents one of the biggest challenges for those who seek full 
abrogation of the exclusionary rule: In the absence of the exclusionary rule, in 
the face of new police technologies or changing social conditions
60
, how exactly 
will the Court find opportunity to draw (or redraw) Fourth Amendment 
boundaries?  Those seeking abolition of the rule will point to civil rights 
litigation as an available source of constitutional boundary drawing.
61
  42 
U.S.C. § 1983 does provide a private cause of action for a citizen whose Fourth 
Amendment rights have been offended.  And by resolving these civil cases, 
appellate courts could conceivably announce new Fourth Amendment rules 
for good cops to follow. 
However, historically, § 1983 cases have not proven particularly effective 
at framing Fourth Amendment issues for appellate court resolution.
62
  And if 
 
 59 A fair critique is that not every motion to exclude presents a novel line-drawing opportunity for the 
Court.  Perhaps, then, we should make the exclusionary rule only operative for cases at the borders 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine.  The devil is in the details, of course.  You could argue that any case 
involving a warrantless search sits at the edge of Fourth Amendment doctrine inasmuch as each case 
would turn on its unique facts and circumstances. 
 60 Exclusionary rule practice does more than give appellate courts the cases they need to resolve the 
Fourth Amendment questions prompted by new technologies. Exclusionary rule practice also gives 
appellate courts the power to recalibrate, at a systemic level, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
standard in response to changing social conditions. The Warren Court, fair to say, used the post-
Mapp exclusionary rule cases to rebalance the reasonableness standard in favor of individual rights 
and away from asserted crime-fighting interests. See Davies, supra note 42, at 983 (“[T]he impetus 
for incorporation in Mapp surely traces back directly to the horrors of lynch justice in the Scottsboro 
Case, Brown v. Mississippi, and far too many others.” (footnotes omitted)).  By the same token, it 
was the exclusionary rule that gave the Burger and Rehnquist courts the opportunity to recalibrate 
that balance away from individual rights and in favor of asserted crime-fighting goals.  See id. at 994 
(reviewing that the so-called “war on drugs” gave the Burger Court “a substantial and continuing flow 
of potential cases” to work with “because prosecutions for possessory offenses almost always involved 
a search and seizure”). 
 61 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) (suggesting that “many forms of police 
misconduct are deterred by civil-rights suits”); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in 
Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 674 (2011) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s tendency “to consider the availability of constitutional tort remedies as a justification for 
denying the remedy of suppression”). 
 62 The Legal Training Handbook cites some sixty different Supreme Court cases that articulate Fourth 
Amendment rules to guide good cops in the field.  Section 1983 practice prompted less than a quarter 
of these boundary-drawing cases.  And critically, the Section 1983 cases that are cited are rather old; 
they predate the Court’s modern qualified immunity doctrine.  See generally LEGAL TRAINING 
HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 353–473. 
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§ 1983 litigation ever had the capacity to foster constitutional boundary 
drawing, it doesn’t any longer.
63
  The modern Supreme Court’s expansive 
qualified immunity doctrine has seen to that.  First, it has made recovery of 
money damages near impossible in § 1983 claims, giving plaintiffs little 
incentive to pursue a claim before the courts.
64
  And even if a plaintiff gives it 
a go, the court has endorsed a decision-making procedure expressly designed 
to avoid resolving novel Fourth Amendment questions.65 
II. 
Having a rulebook is great.  But a good cop interested in constitutional 
policing also needs training in how to apply those rules in the field.  Keep in 
mind that we do not expect good cops to observe a Fourth Amendment 
boundary on the horizon and stay as far away as possible.  Rather, we expect 
good cops to pursue crimes up to—but not beyond—the constitutional 
boundary.  And that requires training.  Which brings us to the second plank 
of the good cop theory of the exclusionary rule: the widely recognized link 
between exclusionary rule practice and quality police training in Fourth 
Amendment rules of engagement. 
 
 63 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 191, 191 (2010) (tracking the limits of the modern Section 1983 cases and predicting 
“the substantial elimination of Fourth Amendment litigation in the Roberts Court.”); Perrin et al, 
supra note 14, at 737–38 (noting that while colorable, “civil suits for tortious conduct based on illegal 
searches and seizures are recognized as practically ineffective and remedially inadequate”); Maclin, 
supra note 8, at 61–62 (concluding that § 1983 litigation does not prevent Fourth Amendment 
violations). 
 64 In a 2018 article, William Baude observed that in the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has 
heard thirty cases asking whether qualified immunity should protect a government defendant from 
paying damages for a constitutional intrusion; in all but two of those case, the Court immunized the 
defendant from paying damages.  William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 45, 82 (2018). 
 65 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (endorsing process whereby a trial court can 
dismiss § 1983 case based on qualified immunity without ever considering whether there was a 
constitutional violation in the first place); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 132–36 (discussing diminished impact of § 1983 
litigation on development of Fourth Amendment boundaries).  Qualified immunity does not 
preempt § 1983 claims for injunctions or other equitable relief.  But these claims too are routinely 
dismissed long before courts might have occasion to draw a constitutional boundary.  See City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff could not obtain "equitable 
standing" unless plaintiff could demonstrate substantial certainty of future misconduct directed at 
plaintiff). 
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No one seems to dispute that exclusionary rule practice catalyzes quality 
policing training in America.
66
  The evidence is compelling.  The Court 
nationalized the exclusionary rule in 1961.
67
  In the years before that, roughly 
half of state courts had no exclusionary rule.
68
  Looking at the before and after 
data, Wayne LaFave, writing in 1965, reported that “[i]t is clear that the 
exclusionary rule has served as a stimulus to police training on the legal 
requirements of search and arrest . . . . [S]ince Mapp the FBI has greatly 
intensified its efforts in training state and local officers on the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.”
69
  Conservative members of the Supreme Court 
recognized this link.  In the 1984 Leon opinion, Justice White observed that 
the exclusionary rule provides an “impetus” to police training programs that 
both “make officers aware of the limits imposed by the [F]ourth [A]mendment 
and emphasize the need to operate within those limits.”
70 
 And in his 2006 
opinion in Hudson, Justice Scalia acknowledged that in the fifty years since 
Mapp, there has been “increasing professionalism of police forces”71 and 





 66 William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 
448 (1997) (noting that since Mapp, “experienced officers are the first to say that the quality of police 
training and the degree to which police obey the law have risen dramatically over the past three 
decades or so”); see also Yale Kamisar, Remembering the “Old World” of Criminal Procedure: A 
Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 559 (1990) (reviewing connection between 
exclusionary rule practice and improved police training); Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the 
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977) (“The key 
to the exclusionary rule’s effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I believe, in the impetus it has provided to 
police training programs . . . .”). 
 67 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 68 Oliver, supra note 42, at 511. 
 69 Lafave, supra note 43, at 594; see also Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure 
Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 119, 123–26 (2003) (reviewing evidence establishing 
that Mapp immediately spurred police training in Fourth Amendment rules); Potter Stewart, The 
Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1400 (1983) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is 
intended to create an incentive for law enforcement officials to establish procedures by which police 
officers are trained to comply with the [F]ourth [A]mendment[.]”). 
 70 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (quoting Israel, supra note 66, at 1412–13); cf. id. at 
918 (noting that the exclusionary rule’s deterrent impact depends on “alter[ing] the behavior of 
individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments” (emphasis added)).  
 71  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).   
 72 Id. at 600 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51 (1993)).  Justice Scalia’s broader point may have been that 
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The challenge is discerning the mechanism at play—how exactly does 
exclusionary rule practice improve police training?  The best theory is that in 
a form of institutional or bureaucratic deterrence, police departments are 
“deterred” from letting officer training lapse for fear of successful motions to 
exclude.
73
  This is what William Mertens and Silas Wasserstrom in a 1992 
article called “systemic deterrence.”
74
  The notion here is that while an 
individual cop may not be impacted by loss of evidence in a particular case, 
the aggregate of lost evidence would refract at a systemic level.  Thus, to avoid 
giving a defendant fodder for a successful motion to exclude, police 




We are, of course, dealing with deterrence again, and beyond the pre- vs. 
post-Mapp comparison, a search for empirical proof of the exclusionary rule’s 
 
because police training had improved so much since Mapp, exclusionary rule practice was no longer 
necessary to deter bad cops.  Id.  Justice Ginsberg effectively rebutted this point in her dissent in 
Herring v. United States: “professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy—not of its 
superfluity.”  555 U.S. 135, 156 n.6 (2009) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting). 
73 To be sure, there is a less cynical explanation: perhaps police departments train their officers to 
respect Fourth Amendment boundaries simply because respecting Fourth Amendment boundaries 
is the right thing to do.  Even so, the exclusionary rule is probably still at work here.  By announcing 
that Fourth Amendment values are so sacred that we are prepared to let a guilty person go free, the 
court expresses “society’s authoritative moral condemnation” of Fourth Amendment intrusions; this 
condemnation, in turn, informs the value system of police leadership.  Kinports, supra note 21, at 
834–35 (citation omitted).  This is what you might call the “moral or educative influence” of the 
exclusionary rule: “[a]s a visible expression of social disapproval for the violation of these guarantees, 
the exclusionary rule makes the guarantees of the [F]ourth [A]mendment credible.”  Oaks, supra 
note 15, at 711; see also Johannes Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influence of Criminal Law, in 
LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 50, 50-59 
(Juan Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, eds., 1977); Steven Cann & Bob Egbert, The Exclusionary 
Rule: Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 23 HOW. L.J. 299, 317 (observing that the 
exclusionary rule works as “a communicative device, teaching and reinforcing democratic values”); 
Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 23, at 321 (“[T]o the extent police officers respect and accept the 
constitutional principles of search and seizure, they will be more inclined to follow those rules.”). 
 74 See generally William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 394 (1981) 
(using the term “systemic deterrence” to describe the exclusionary rule’s “effect on individual police 
officers through a police department’s institutional compliance with judicially articulated [F]ourth 
[A]mendment standards”). 
 75 Id. at 399 (observing that to protect prosecutions “professional police forces can be expected to 
encourage [F]ourth [A]mendment compliance through training and such guidelines as the 
department provides for conducting searches, seizures, and arrests”); see also United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he chief deterrent function of the rule is its 
tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of 
law enforcement agencies generally.”). 
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enduring “systemic deterrence” bears no fruit.  But here, the economic 
models do predict that exclusionary rule practice will catalyze quality police 
training.
76
  One can easily discern an efficient economic model: In 2012, in 
United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that police must obtain a 
warrant before attaching a GPS device to a private vehicle.77  Now imagine a 
case after Jones where the prosecution seeks to use evidence from a GPS 
device that was attached to a vehicle without first obtaining a warrant.  Even 
under today’s constrained exclusionary rule, it would be hard for a court to 
find a way around exclusion.
78
  How do law enforcement institutions avoid that 
outcome?  They make sure they teach officers the rule announced in Jones.  
It comes as no surprise, then, what you find on pages 342–43 of the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Manual: Instruction that attaching a GPS tracking 




Unlike the bad cop deterrence theory, both planks of the good cop theory 
of the exclusionary rule enjoy broad-spectrum support.  Indeed, even 
conservative members of the Supreme Court acknowledge that the 
exclusionary rule fosters necessary Fourth Amendment line-drawing and that 
it catalyzes better police training.  And yet, before the Court, when it comes to 
assessing the public policy benefits of the exclusionary rule, the good cop 
theory is apparently off-the-table.  For over forty years now, the Supreme 
Court has insisted that that the exclusionary rule’s public policy benefits are to 
 
 76 See Slobogin, supra note 17, at 395 (observing that economic analysis “suggests that organizational 
liability should work relatively well in connection with police departments”). 
 77 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).    
 78 For the time being, at least, evidence collected as a direct consequence of an unlawful warrantless 
search is to be automatically excluded.  See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
 79 LEGAL TRAINING HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 342–43.  Granted, the Handbook is an easy model.  
For a good cop in the field, the questions are often more vexing, turning on nuanced questions of 
whether there is “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” for a search without a warrant.  How 
does the exclusionary rule encourage police training on how to resolve these more nebulous 
questions?  Consider a new officer testifying, in a close case, that she had probable cause for an arrest.  
Now imagine that on cross-examination, the new officer testifies she had no training whatsoever on 
how to assess probable cause for an arrest.  This lack of training, fair to say, would raise the judicial 
eyebrows and weigh heavily in favor of exclusion.  To avoid this, what do police departments do?  
They train officers on how to constitutionally assess probable cause for an arrest. 
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be measured singularly and exclusively by its utility in deterring bad cops in 
the field.
80
  What is going on here? 
The rule that exclusion of evidence is the proper response to a Fourth 
Amendment violation dates to a 1914 case, Weeks v. United States.81  There, 
the Supreme Court announced that evidence gathered in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment could not be considered at trial because to consider such 
evidence would make the judiciary complicit in the police wrongdoing.
82
  The 
Court could not stomach “to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if 
not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the 
protection of the people[.]”
83  
Notably, the Weeks’ Court did not mention 
anything about the utility of the rule in promoting better policing.  Indeed, for 
the first fifty years of its existence, the consensus was that the exclusionary rule 
was designed to protect the integrity of the judiciary.
84 
The Supreme Court first discussed the notion that the exclusionary rule 
might have some social utility in a 1960 decision, Elkins v. United States.85  It 
was in Elkins that the Supreme Court first suggested that one purpose of the 
exclusionary rule “is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty 
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.”
86
  The Court in Elkins did not suggest that deterrence was the singular value 
served by the exclusion of evidence; the Court also noted “the imperative of 
judicial integrity.”
87
  However, in a series of cases in the 1970s, a conservative 
 
 80 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011) (“[W]e have said time and again that the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.”).  
 81 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that withholding of documents taken 
from the accused’s house without a warrant constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment).  
Scholars will often trace the modern exclusionary rule to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
However, Boyd was about invoices turned over to the police.  Id. at 618.  At bottom, Boyd was a 
case about the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment—in the sense that using 
someone’s invoice against them is akin to compelling them to testify against themselves.  See generally 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 729 (1999) 
(“Boyd opened the way for later court decisions to create modern [Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule] doctrine, but it did not actually do so itself.”). 
 82 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393–94. 
 83 Id. at 394. 
 84 See Kamisar, supra note 3, at 565 n.1 (noting the exclusionary rule “did originally and for much of 
its life” rest on principle rather than utility (emphasis omitted)). 
 85 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 86 Id. at 217. 
 87 Id. at 222; see also Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385 (1968) (“[T]he decision we reach today is not 
based upon language and doctrinal symmetry alone.  It is buttressed as well by the ‘imperative of 
judicial integrity.’” (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222)). 
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bloc of the Supreme Court began to insist that deterrence of bad cops in the 
field was actually the only purpose of the exclusionary rule.
88 
What were the conservatives up to?  Well, one year after Elkins, the Court 
announced its opinion in Mapp v. Ohio.89  Prior to Mapp, the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule was a rather sleepy doctrine; it only applied to 
federal prosecutions, and most federal prosecutions involved tax, liquor, and 
gambling offenses.
90
  Exclusion of relevant evidence in these cases simply 
didn’t foment much public outrage.91  But Mapp nationalized the rule, 
requiring that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must 
also be excluded in state court proceedings.
92
  Because state courts prosecute 
the vast majority of crimes in America, including nearly all violent crimes, 
exclusion of evidence suddenly did foment outrage—both from the public
93
 
and from conservative jurists and scholars.
94 
 
 88 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) 
(explaining that the Court “has established that the prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole one, is 
to deter future unlawful police conduct.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 89  367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 90 See Davies, supra note 42, at 991 (“Prior to the incorporation doctrine, federal constitutional 
standards had largely applied either to the sorts of white-collar crimes that did not overly scare or 
incite the public, or to the alcohol or drug cases that fell within the limited reach of federal court 
jurisdiction.”). 
 91 See id. at 991–92 (stating that public sentiment at the time did not favor widely extending Fourth 
Amendment protections to violent crimes); Oliver, supra note 42, at 474–75 (suggesting that even 
modern critics of the exclusionary rule would have found “defensible” its application to curb 
Prohibition excesses). 
 92 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655–56. 
 93 See Davies, supra note 42, at 991 (recounting that after Mapp, “the search cases that reached the 
Court were no longer confined to booze, drugs, and white-collar crimes; now they sometimes also 
included burglary, armed robbery, rape, and murder[,] [a]nd the extension of constitutional 
protections to persons accused of violent crimes did incite and scare the public”); Goodpaster, supra 
note 27, at 1065, 1067 (writing in 1982 that “[p]ublic fear of crime is intense” and “[i]n this 
atmosphere of public fear, desperation, and anger, the exclusionary rule appears a sinister ally of 
criminal forces”). 
 94 As a judge on the D.C. Circuit and later as Chief Justice, Warren Burger practically went on a lecture 
tour railing against the exclusionary rule.  Laurin, supra note 61, at 690 (“Burger came to the Court 
in 1969 with a well-known record of hostility toward the exclusionary rule, and over the course of his 
tenure pursued an agenda directed toward its curtailment.” (footnote omitted)); see also Donald A. 
Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual 
Deterrence,” 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 749 (2010) (“Reflecting the electoral sentiment of the 
1970s, new justices showed more concern for law enforcement . . . . [And] embraced a purely 
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In the years following Mapp, there were certainly calls for complete 
abrogation of exclusionary rule.
95
  But by the late 1970s, a pragmatic 
conservative opposition had coalesced around the goal of establishing a “good 
faith” exception to the rule.
96
  The idea was that where an officer in good faith 
believed they commanded the requisite probable cause and properly obtained 
a warrant before conducting a search, if the search was later found infirm, 
exclusion of evidence would serve no utilitarian purpose.  The officer’s good 
faith meant there was no “bad cop” to deter, and therefore, the reasoning goes, 
no reason for exclusion.
97
  
There is some good sense here.  Good faith surely does diminish the 
deterrence values of the exclusionary rule, whatever they be.  But an officer’s 
good faith doesn’t diminish other benefits obtained by the exclusionary rule—
like fostering constitutional line-drawing and catalyzing well trained police 
forces.  But the conservatives were looking for a hard rule against the exclusion 
remedy.  And the good faith exception could only work to wholly nullify the 
exclusionary rule’s operation if the entire operation was premised on deterring 
bad cops in the field.
98
  In United States v. Calandra, a 1974 decision, a 
conservative majority laid the groundwork, establishing that the exclusionary 
rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
 
deterrent view of the exclusionary rule, expressive of a new Supreme Court majority more 
sympathetic to law enforcement than the last.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing in favor of 
“overruling this judicially contrived doctrine”). 
 96 See Israel, supra note 66, at 1408–09 (reviewing Justice White’s efforts to build a majority in favor of 
adopting good faith exception as a moderate curtailment of exclusionary rule that fell short of outright 
abrogation); Davies, supra note 42, at 1006 (reviewing momentum for good faith exception after the 
Supreme Court stopped short of abolishing the exclusionary rule in its 1976 opinions). 
 97 See generally Dripps, supra note 31, at 909 (reviewing basic premise of good faith exception: “When 
the police believe their actions to be legal, the threat of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not 
likely to affect their behavior”). 
 98 It is perhaps best to understand the elevation of the bad cop deterrence theory as a sort of “creation 
story” composed by conservative jurists seeking doctrinal coherence for their efforts to weaken the 
exclusionary rule.  See Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two 
Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 394 (2010) (assessing Chief 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Herring: “Their 
opinions reflect two distinct ‘creation stories’ about the exclusionary rule, stories that not only 
describe the history of the rule very differently, but also have completely different articulations of the 
rule’s purposes and its place in the constitutional structure”). 
April 2021] GOOD COPS, BAD COPS 261 
   
 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”
99
  Ten years later, in United States 
v. Leon, the other shoe dropped, and the Court recognized the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.
100
  
Today, deterrence of bad cops in the field is not just the primary 
justification for the rule, it is the only justification.
101
  Here is Justice Roberts 
writing for the Court in Davis v. United States, a 2011 decision: “[W]e have 
said time and again that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
misconduct by law enforcement.”
102
  What to make, then, of the Court’s earlier 
recognition that excluding illegally obtained evidence from trial might serve 
other values?  In his 2006 opinion in Hudson, Justice Scalia explained that 
away as his predecessors’ sloppiness.
103 
IV. 
We now have two important premises before us: First, the exclusionary 
rule exists only on the ground that it deters bad cops in the field from intruding 
on Fourth Amendment rights.  Second, the exclusionary rule, as best we can 
tell, does not deter bad cops in the field.  You can probably see where this is 
going. 
In a series of cases over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has 
aggressively extended the reach of the good faith exception, emphasizing at 
each turn the exclusionary rule’s fanciful deterrent impacts.  For example, in 
the Court’s 2009 decision in Herring, Chief Justice Roberts held that the 
 
 99 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (“This Court . . . 
has established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful 
police conduct.’” (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347)).  
 100 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). 
 101 See Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of 
Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 53 (2010) (“Over 
the course of the last fifty years . . . deterrence has occupied a growing centrality to the point that it is 
now considered the only benefit and purpose of the exclusionary rule.”); Clancy, supra note 3, at 357 
(“Deterrence is now the rule’s sole purpose, despite decades of Supreme Court declarations that that 
purpose has never been empirically proven and despite much skepticism about whether the rule does 
in fact deter.”). 
 102 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011). 
 103 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“We did not always speak so guardedly.  
Expansive dicta in Mapp, for example, suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule.”).  Today, 
deterrence as the singular measure of the rule’s efficacy is so deep-seated that more liberal members 
don’t even challenge the notion.  See Davis, 564 U.S. at 250 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Under our 
precedents, the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations.  Accordingly, we have held, application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted when it 
does not result in appreciable deterrence.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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“marginal deterrence” of the exclusionary rule could not justify exclusion of 
evidence in a case where a Fourth Amendment violation stemmed from a 
good faith police recordkeeping error.
104
  And in the Court’s 2011 decision in 
Davis, Justice Alito found exclusion inappropriate when police conduct a 
search in good faith reliance on precedent that is later overturned.
105
  Justice 




In one sense, these cases can be read as just another land grab in the 
modern Court’s long guerilla war against the exclusionary rule’s scope.  But it 
is hard to ignore the Court’s signaling of a more fundamental change to the 
exclusionary rule regime.  Any number of scholars have observed that the 
Court appears poised to forsake once-and-for-all the “classic” exclusionary 
rule, which, at least on paper, still contemplates exclusion as the automatic 
response in a broad swath of cases involving unlawful warrantless searches.
107
  
The new rule will be thus: In all cases, a trial court may only exclude ill-gotten 
evidence where the costs of exclusion are outweighed by the benefits 
obtained.
108
  The foundation for the balancing regime was laid in 2006’s 
 
 104 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009).  
 105 See Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (“[W]hen the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief 
that their conduct is lawful, . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot 
pay its way.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 106 Id. at 241; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (taking expansive view of attenuation 
theory to insulate unconstitutional investigatory stop from application of exclusionary rule). 
 107 See Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to 
Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1185 (2012) (discussing 
the evolution of the exclusionary rule from a formal legal remedy to a more discretionary judicial 
instrument); James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 390–91 (2011) (highlighting the Court’s role in redefining the 
circumstances that render the exclusionary rule applicable); Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude 
or Not to Exclude: The Future of the Exclusionary Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 198 (2009) (“[T]he Herring v. United States decision’s rationale could 
arguably support a more general exception to the exclusionary rule that applies to all police conduct, 
including warrantless searches.”).  But see Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1–2 (2012) (suggesting that “the exclusionary rule, though limited, is 
neither dead nor unacceptably constrained” and offering that Herring could be read to require 
exclusion “when negligence has substantially interfered with a suspect’s privacy rights, such as through 
an illegal arrest or an illegal search of his car or house”). 
 108 See Jacobi, supra note 13, at 587 (“The Roberts Court has determined that future application of the 
exclusionary rule will depend on whether its value in terms of deterring police from constitutional 
violations is deemed to outweigh the social costs to the justice system.”); Richard M. Re, The Due 
Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1898 (2014) (“[T]he Court’s ‘pay its way’ 
 
April 2021] GOOD COPS, BAD COPS 263 
   
 
Hudson decision where Justice Scalia indicated that the exclusionary remedy 
should be reserved for cases “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 
‘substantial social costs.’”
109
  Three years later, in Herring, Chief Justice 
Roberts asserted that in order for a court to exclude evidence “the deterrent 
effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice 
system.”
110
  And two years after that, in Davis, Justice Alito explained that “[f]or 
exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must 
outweigh its heavy costs.”
111
 
Under this balancing regime, on the costs side of the scales, the Court will 
no doubt engage in a searching assessment.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted in 
Herring, the “principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and 
possibly dangerous defendants go free.”
112
  But that is the principal cost; the 
Court will surely find more room on the scales: Exclusion of evidence subverts 
the truth-finding mission of the courts,
113
 and has the “effect of generating 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.”
114
  It over-incentivizes 
defense counsel to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim, which clogs the 
courts
115
 and misallocates defense resources away from building a client’s 
 
reasoning suggests that the exclusionary rule should apply only in certain limited categories of Fourth 
Amendment cases, such as when the police engage in outrageous conduct, pursue relatively 
unimportant criminals, or systematically violate the law.”). 
 109 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 110 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009). 
 111 Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.  Justice Alito read the Court’s precedents to say that “[w]here suppression 
fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly . . . unwarranted.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).  
 112 Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (“Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the 
judicial system and society at large . . . . [I]ts bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth 
and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.” (citations omitted)); Hudson, 547 
U.S. at 591 (“The exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs,’ which sometimes include 
setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 
(1984))). 
 113 See Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (observing that exclusion “almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, 
trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence”); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 
(1980) (“Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding 
functions of judge and jury.”) (emphasis added)). 
 114 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976). 
 115 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595 (emphasizing that if exclusion were proper remedy for knock-and-
announce violations, it “would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule”). 
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  In sum, in any game of balancing, the costs of applying 
the exclusionary remedy will always be quite heavy.
117
 
And on the benefits side of the scales?  For now, the Court’s search will 
begin and end with the rule’s deterrent impacts on a small set of bad cops.  In 
Herring, where the Court first broadly mapped the exclusionary rule balancing 
regime, the only benefit the Court would put on the scales was “the potential 
of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.”
118
  And, of course, if the 
exclusionary rule has no discernible deterrent values, how could the benefits 
of exclusion ever outweigh the costs?  You do not need scales to know that a 
gnat weighs less than a cat.  Where we are headed, it sure seems, is the 
functional demise of the exclusionary rule. 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing particularly objectionable about the Court’s insistence 
that the exclusionary rule survive on its utility in fostering constitutional 
policing.  Considering the costs, it is not unreasonable to ask that the rule, in 
the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “pay its way” in terms of its public policy 
benefits.
119
  What is objectionable is the Supreme Court’s insistence that the 
rule’s benefits be measured exclusively by its phantom deterrence effect on 
bad cops in the field. 
It doesn't have to be this way.  Indeed, one of the appeals of a pure 
balancing regime is that the Court can dispense with its tortured reliance on 
the good faith exception to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule.  In a true 
balancing regime, an officer’s good faith (or recklessness or malice) can go on 
the scales with everything else.  The challenge for the court is how to unwind 
thirty years of insisting, as a way of expanding the good faith exception, that 
the rule turned exclusively on its deterrence values. 
It is not so complicated.  All the Court need do is announce that when 
balancing the benefits of exclusion against its social costs, courts should place 
 
 116 See Stuntz, supra note 64, at 443 (“The exclusionary rule skews criminal trials and criminal appeals 
by diverting scarce resources into a path separate from the question [of] whether the defendant did 
the crime.”).  Some members of the Court would also put intrusion on state autonomy as an 
important cost.  See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
assumption that state courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule is legally dubious . . . .”). 
 117 For a full accounting of the costs from a law and economics perspective, see Jacobi, supra note 13, 
at 589.   
 118 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).  
 119  Id. at 147–48. 
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on the scales all the public policy benefits obtained by the rule, including how 
exclusionary rule practice provides good cops with the tools they need to do 
their jobs consonant with Fourth Amendment values.
120
  But that’s presuming 
the Court is interested in a coherent exclusionary rule. 
In the old days of boxing, when a promoter wanted to set up an easy win 
for a fighter, he looked for a “tomato can”—an unworthy opponent who would 
present little obstacle to a win in the ring.  A majority of the modern court 
grew up in a conservative legal movement deeply hostile to the exclusionary 
rule.  In the exclusionary rule debate, these jurists may have everything to like 
about the bad cop deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule.  It is a tomato 
can: a policy argument in support of the exclusionary rule so weak that it offers 
little obstacle to the rule’s effective abrogation. 
  
 
 120 In its decisions minimizing the rule’s deterrent impacts on officers in the field, the Supreme Court 
has reserved that exclusion might be appropriate where some “systemic” or “recurrent” police 
misconduct is at play.  See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (weighing a lack of systemic 
and recurrent police misconduct into the Court’s decision not to exclude evidence); Herring, 555 
U.S. at 144 (allowing that exclusion may be appropriate where there was “systemic negligence”).  
However, “[b]eyond incantation of these apparent terms of art, virtually no explanation is provided 
as to their meaning.”  Laurin, supra note 61, at 684.  Arguably, one could read these reservations as 
broad enough to capture the values underlying the good cop theory.  But it is entirely unclear how a 
defendant might get these values on the scales.  See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The 
Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561, 561 (2019) (reviewing challenges 
an individual defendant will face in presenting proof of recurring or systemic negligence). 
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